The Real Murphy's Law in Combat

The Real Murphy’s Law in Combat

“Whatever can go wrong, will go wrong.”

Civilians tend to treat Murphy’s Law as a joke.  Combat veterans know that Murphy’s Law is an integral part of combat operations.  Murphy is active at every level of military operations from strategic planning and logistics right down to the individual infantryman’s training and equipment.  Expect the unexpected, remain mentally flexible, crush disappointment and deal with the situation as it exists, think on your feet.

“Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.”

This is part of what Karl von Clausewitz termed as “friction.”  There are so many factors working against someone in combat that even the simplest actions are fraught with difficulty and danger.  What works perfectly in a controlled situation or in everyday civilian life may come apart under the applied stress of combat.

Clausewitz understood Murphy very well.  In his work “On War” Clausewitz described Murphy’s Law as friction.  The following paragraph is the second paragraph in chapter VII, “Friction in War”, from book I “On the Nature of War”.

“Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.  The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.  Imagine a traveler who late in the day decides to cover two more stages before nightfall.  Only four or five hours more, on a paved highway with relays of horses:  it should be an easy trip.  But at the next station he finds no fresh horses, or only poor ones; the country grows hilly, the road bad, night falls, and finally after many difficulties he is only too glad to reach a resting place with any kind of primitive accommodation.  It is much the same in war.  Countless minor incidents– the kind you can never really foresee– combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls far short of the intended goal.  Iron will-power can overcome this friction; it pulverizes every obstacle, but of course it wears down the machine as well.  We shall often return to this point.  The proud spirit’s firm will dominates the art of war as an obelisk dominates the town square on which all roads converge.”

The friction is going to exist no matter what we do.  We need to allow for it and deal with it when it happens.

Clausewitz wrote that this friction is “inconceivable unless one has experienced war.”  That is why it is so vital to have men with real combat experience at every level in the military.  When training and doctrine is being established by people who can’t understand war, the effectiveness of the military decreases dramatically.  At the operational level men should only second guess procedures developed by combat veterans with great fear and trepidation.  It’s difficult to recognize and accept that you don’t know what you don’t know.  Napoleon once said that he had a kitchen mule that had been through twenty campaigns with him but was still a mule.  One year of experience twenty times is not the same as twenty years of experience.  One year of directed experience is better than twenty years of experiences that don’t bear on the problem.

(A quick note on Clausewitz; be careful when you purchase a translation of his work.  Several versions are badly translated and most are poorly edited.  The first copy of “On War” I received as a gift was the Penguin Classics edition.  The translator removed most of the chapters on strategy and tactics as he felt that they were dated and would be of no interest to the scholar.  I asked myself, “The scholar of what?”)

“Keep it simple, stupid!”

The KISS principle is a direct response to Murphy’s law.  KISS is probably the single most important response to Murphy.  Complexity equals more opportunities for things to go wrong.  Everything including doctrine, planning, equipment, and communications needs to be kept as KISS simple as is practical.  Unless advantages all out of proportion to the potential problems can be gained by increased complexity, it should be avoided.

You may find yourself striking a balance between ideal effectiveness and simplicity.  It is better to master a few basic techniques than to turn into an encyclopedia of combat techniques but still be unable to execute any of them perfectly.  A rifle that always works is better than a more complex rifle that malfunctions; regardless of the supposed advantages of the complex rifle.

“Proper previous planning prevents piss-poor performance.”

You must try to account for all the elements of an operation as well as potential problems that will occur.  This means you must come up with a workable plan initially but you must also attempt comprehensive contingency planning as well.  Your planning must be thorough but simple.  If a critical element of your plan fails for any reason, the entire plan may fail.  The more critical elements you put into a plan, the more opportunity there is for failure.

Avoid over-planning.  Come up with something workable and perfect that rather than adding in more Murphy factors.  Use checklists and flowcharts to organize each part of the plan.  Use your own experience and the experience of others as a guide.  What has worked in the past in similar situations?  What hasn’t?  What are realistic expectations for the performance of men and equipment?  Get with your senior people and get their input on things before you finalize.

Combat presents a real dichotomy of planning versus improvisation.  The planning and training must be meticulous.  Every detail must be accounted for.  And yet there has to be a flexibility in dealing with problems that occur outside the initial plan.

“Improvise, adapt, overcome.”

Even when the original plan has become derailed; keep planning.  Stay two jumps ahead of your opponent.  As Major John Plaster says, “Play chess while the enemy is playing checkers.”

Basic training needs to emphasize the essential skills that will be used almost whatever the situation.  Training for a specific mission will let you work out some of the bugs and be proficient at your mission specific tasks.  Training otherwise should emphasize mental flexibility and perseverance.

A big part of many special forces selection courses is testing to see how potential candidates react to unexpected changes in plans.  Will they simply fold and give up?  Or will they crush their disappointment and deal with the new situation?

One of the tests is fairly simple.  The recruits go on an extended forced march.  They are told that at the end of the march trucks will be waiting to carry them the many miles back to camp.  Usually the time the recruits are given to complete the march is too short to begin with.  When the recruits come slogging over the final hill they arrive just in time to see the trucks disappearing over the next rise.  At this point a fair percentage of them will give up and quit the selection course.  Often, the ones who are willing to keep going no matter what will find the trucks waiting for them just over the next rise.

Don’t just test yourself.  Constantly test everything including tactics and equipment.  Test under conditions that come as close to combat as possible.  Something that won’t work under controlled conditions definitely won’t work in the field.

“Pay attention to detail.”

Anybody who’s been through basic training has heard this one.  Musashi said, “Pay attention even to trifles.”  Every small failure adds to the overall friction.  There is no way to tell exactly what is going to turn out to be a critical element until after it has failed.  Something as simple as leaving your bootlaces hanging out can cause all kinds of problems by snagging on something.  Being slightly off with the coordinates when you call in an artillery strike can get real interesting.  Failing to get a current weather report, forgetting extra batteries for the satcom or forgetting a piece of special mission specific equipment may cause a mission to fail or be scrubbed.

There are also details that will crop up as a mission continues.  Signs of the enemy can give you all sorts of useful intelligence, but only if you take notice of them.  Spotting a tripwire or ambush before you walk into it is a good thing.  Small changes in the behavior of the enemy or your surroundings may give you an early indication that something is up.  Pay attention to detail.  Concentrate on what you are doing and what is going on around you.  There is no shortcut to this.

Obviously the more details you have to keep track of, the more likely it is that you will miss one.  Checklists and training are tools that can help you manage the details but the best way to deal with them is to minimize them.  We’re back to KISS.

Another way to fight Murphy is through redundancy.  When one element fails it’s good to have something to fall back on.  Just like everything else redundancy should be present at all levels.  A balance must be struck between a useful level of redundancy and a level that presents more problems than it can solve.  Carrying a spare firing pin might be practical.  Carrying a spare rifle probably is not.

Examples of redundancy include dual firing systems in demolitions, carrying spare parts for critical equipment or even carrying spare equipment.  It may be useful to duplicate necessary supplies such as batteries.  Cross training of personnel allows the mission to continue should one person with mission essential skills become a casualty.  The repeating or reading back of instructions or communications will help minimize miscommunications and misunderstandings.  Double or triple-checking of equipment may catch problems missed the first time, especially when done by multiple personnel.  Have alternate routes, rally points, and extraction points planned before you need them.

“No plan has ever survived contact with the enemy, intact.”

Combat is fluid.  Assuming a plan will work flawlessly is failing to take enemy action into account.  It would be similar to a football team playing their called plays without responding in the slightest to the opposing team’s responses.  You have to remain flexible.  The enemy will respond to whatever you do.  The enemy may have advance knowledge of your plan and prepare a response ahead of time.

“Know yourself and know your enemy and though you fight one hundred battles you will never be defeated.”

Deception and unpredictability will reduce the chances that the enemy will know what you are doing.  Don’t take the same trail more than once.  Better yet, don’t take a trail at all.  Don’t return by the same path you took going in.  Watch your camouflage and noise discipline.  Be very careful about blindly following doctrine.  The enemy may have read the same manuals you did.

Gather your intelligence carefully.  Get all the intelligence that is available and then don’t trust it.  The enemy will be doing his best to deceive you.  Consider the source and age of any intelligence you may get.  Be prepared to adjust if your information is wrong.

“It ain’t over, till it’s over.”

Don’t relax until the mission is really over.  Murphy doesn’t take breaks and neither should you.  Two of the most dangerous points in a mission are going out and coming back.  Closest to home is where troops are most relaxed and careless.  The enemy knows this.  Be most alert where you are usually most comfortable.  Be especially alert at first and last light for the same reasons.  The mission may be over as far as you are concerned but perhaps nobody told the enemy or Murphy.

Always remember the two most basic and pervasive principles in combat– Murphy and KISS.